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Strict Liability, Capped Strict Liability  
And 
 Care Effort Under Asymmetric Information 
By  
GERARD MONDELLO
*
 
This paper compares the effectiveness ofstrict liability and capped 
strict liability regimesin an agency relationshipamong a regulatory agency 
and operators of risky activities.Under a double asymmetric information 
assumption(wealth and efficiency in care effort), it showsthat capping 
liability is more efficient than keeping with strict liability,this at the price of 
an informational rent. Efficiency means that the efficient agent supplies the 
level of safety effort equivalent to the first best solution one. At the optimum, 
this rent is minimized by the efficient contract supplied by the principal. 
(JEL: K0, K32,Q01, Q58) 
1. Introduction 
In April 2010, the BP’s offshore drilling rig explosion spilled crude oil in 
the Mexico Gulf and polluted it on a large scale. This event reminded us that our 
contemporaneous industrial societies are highly sensitive to technological hazards. 
Productive activities generate potential huge harm with large ripple and 
irreversible effects on public health or natural resources. Hence, nowadays, one 
major task ofgovernments and risky activities corporate managers is to find 
effective tradeoffs between natural resources preservation and economic growth. 
Environmental and economic policy should achieve such a balance by combining 
optimally ex ante regulation instruments (taxes, permits, standards, etc.) and ex 
post liability regimes(KOLSTAD, UHLEN AND JOHNSON [1990]), 
(SCHMITZ[2000]).The range of exante and ex post environmental regulatory 
instruments is wide. Then, harmonizing these tools constitutes a major stake for 
environmental policies.  
However, the present paper will not take the road of optimally combining 
these instruments. Its scope is limited to a comparative analysis within the field of 
strict liability regimes applied to environmental protection. Its object is to 
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determinethe best strict liability regime that inducesthe operators of risky 
activities to supply the optimal care effort under asymmetric information. It 
studies the agency relationship between a principal (a government through for 
instance a regulatory agency) and an operator (agent) who exploits a risky facility. 
The principal has to induce the agent to provide the highest safety level against 
financial transfers. Confiningthe analysis range to the strict liability question 
allowsrestrictingthe field to the ex post liability question only. Indeed,after aharm 
occurrence, Courts do not seek the misconduct or the negligence of the polluter as 
under a negligence rule regime. Under strict liability, Courts have only tocheckthe 
causal link between the harm and the risky activity. Indeed, thiscausationis 
sufficient to assess whether the operator’s actionshas involved the accident or not, 
this, regardless of the level of care exercised beforehand by the manager. 
Conversely, under negligence rule, Courts have to assess the operator’s 
compliance with law, rules and the optimal level of care to determine whether 
afault has been committed or not. For instance, typically, KOLSTAD, UHLEN 
AND JOHNSON [1990] or, still,BOYER AND PORRINI [2006] and [2008]lead 
their analysis under a negligence rule.  
Nowadays, strict liability regimes are implemented to protect the 
environment as under CERCLA in the United States
1
 or, still, the directive on 
Environmental liability in European Union
2
. The enforcement of such regimes 
strives towards twofold objectives: first compensating and repairing damage and, 
second, inducing the potential polluters to take preventive measurestill reaching 
theoptimal level. Without a doubt, this regime advantages victims that can access 
rapidly to compensation without bearing the burden of the proof of the fault. 
However, its weaknesses are several. First, redresses can exceed the polluter’s 
financial capacities and lead him to become judgment proof (SUMMERS[1983]), 
(SHAVELL[1986]). This induces a de facto limited liability. Second, Society as a 
whole will endure the cost of the incomplete internalization. Third, as a 
consequence, the level of care could be undersized (SHAVELL [1986]).However, 
this last point is controversial as shown below. Fourth, the potential polluter can 
strategically organize his judgment-proofness (VAN’T VELD, RAUSSER AND 
SIMON[1997], VAN’T VELD [2006]). Fifth, the level of investment can be 
discouraged when strict liability is extended to lenders (BOYER AND LAFFONT 
[1995] and [1997]). 
Some sensitive sectors as the maritime transportation and the electro-
nuclear industry have reacted to the negative effects of strict liability by putting 
caps on the level of repairs. The operator is exposed to a level of redress 
substantially lower than the amount of the harm. This lightened responsibility 
                                                 
1
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) 
(1980) and Superfund for cleaning-up dangerous waste sites, (see ROMAN [2008]). 
2
 Directive 2004/35/CE of the European parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 
on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental 
damage, L143/56, 30/4/04). See also OECD [2009]. 
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should act as an investment incentive
3
.For instance, the International Convention 
on Liability and Compensation for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage of 2001 stated 
the strict liability of ship-owners for all types of pollution damage caused by 
bunker oil and binds the repairs to an amount calculated in accordance with the 
amended 1976 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 
(SIOPCF [2009]).. Concerning the maritime transport, compensation for oil 
pollution is regulated by the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution (CLC) and the International Convention setting up. The Oil Pollution 
Compensation Fund (Fund Convention) establishes a two-tier liability system 
built upon the (limited) strict liability for the ship owner and a collectively 
financed fund which provides supplementary compensation to victims of oil 
pollution damage who have not obtained full compensation. This last notion 
applies only to people privately concerned by personal losses.After the Exxon 
Valdez disaster, the USA adopted the 1990 Oil Pollution Liability and 
Compensation Act. It states the ability to collect from companies for natural-
resource damage and gives victims the right to make claims directly to the 
company. All claims for damages made under the 1990 act are capped at $75 
million. The law also set up a trust fund to pay claims companies involved in oil 
spills decline to pay. However, after the Deepwater Horizon rig explosion, this 
fund proved to be too low. 
Nuclear civil liability is also based on caps on the redresses
4
. Developing 
nuclear industry involves relieving nuclear operators of the burden of potentially 
ruinous liability claims
5
. They establish a strict liability regime channeled 
exclusively to the operators of the nuclear installations. If this liability is absolute, 
it is limited in time and amount which is set to €1.500M (seeWORLD NUCLEAR 
ASSOCIATION [2009]).At the political level, this analysis is echoed by 
opponents to the introduction of such liability regimes
6
. 
From an economic viewpoint, industrial accidents are negative 
externalities that disturb the classical agency relationship put into evidence in the 
eighties by MASKIN AND RILEY [1984], (BARON AND MYERSON [1982]), 
(MUSSA AND ROSEN [1978], (MYERSON[1981]). These disruptions involve 
that the most efficient agent will not get the first-best outcome.This paper shows 
that under asymmetric information, under a strict liability regime, the principal 
cannot expect from the operator the first rank level of prevention of symmetric 
information. Paradoxically this lastone is reached when is relaxed the strict liable 
                                                 
3
 See for instance BOYD [2001, p.47]:”[…]that environmental costs above the cap will 
be uncompensated by responsible parties(emphasis added).” 
4
See theIAEA's Vienna Convention of 1963, OECD’s Paris Convention of 1960, the 
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) of 1997 and 
2003, the OECD Paris (and Brussels) amended in 2004. For the USA, the Price-Anderson 
Act limits insurance to $300 million and caps the operators’ liability to $10.5 billion. 
5
See OECD, Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)[1982]“Exposé des Motifs, Motif 45” or still 
(SCHWARTZ [2006, p.39]).  
6
In India, see the opposition in 2010 to the Proposed Civil Nuclear Liability [Cap] Bill 
http://www.sacw.net/article1288.html. See also (ANDERSON AND AHMED [1996]). 
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regime for a less rigorous one: the capping of redress. Basically, our model 
assumes the existence of twofold information asymmetry: first, the operator’s 
safety efficiency is unknown from the government and, second, theagent’s level 
of wealth is private information. This twice uncertainty is detrimental in the 
supplying of the first-best level of safety. Then,it is shown that capping the 
amount of repairs lead the efficient agents to supply the first best solution against, 
as a price, a minimized informational rent. Indeed, capping the level of repairs 
removes one level of uncertainty.  
This contribution brings some answers to the controversy about the 
effective impact of bound on repairs. Following SHAVELL [1986], some authors 
consider that caps induce operators to lower their safety effort because they 
proportionate it to the level of redress (FAURE AND HU[2006]), (FAURE AND 
WANG[2008]). Furthermore, under the ceiling of repairs, the internalization 
process remains structurally incomplete because the victims’ rights to full 
compensation are seriously impaired. It is a kind of limitation for a 
liabilityalready limited by wealth.  
However, the debate is open because other authors consider that limiting 
institutionally the amount of the polluters’ repair may induce them to increase the 
safety level beyond the optimal level(JOST [1996], MICELI AND 
SEGERSON[2003]), (DARI-MATTIACCI[2006]). These authors extend the 
analysis of (BEARD [1990]).These contributions insist on the tradeoff between 
the cost of precaution and the amount of wealth dedicated to redress. The liability 
caps are independent from the injurer’s safety expenditures that can contribute to 
limit excessive precaution and reduce the insolvency risk. Hence, a potential 
insolvent agent may be induced to take too much precaution compared to the 
social optimum. This increases the total social costs of accident: the more is spent 
on prevention, the less for repairs. Bounding the liability allows the injurers to 
spare more for compensation (DARI-MATTIACCI[2006]), (DARI-MATTIACCI 
AND DE GEEST [2006]).Here, we join the conclusion of this literature: an 
appropriate ceiling of repairs gives better results than a strict liability regime. The 
main difference is that,under asymmetric information, this regime leads to the first 
best level of prevention ofa complete information situation under a standard strict 
liability regime (i.e. without cap).   
This approach comes from the judgment-proof literature initiated by 
SUMMERS [1983] and SHAVELL [1986], followed byPITCHFORD [1995], 
BOYER AND LAFFONT [1997] or still HEYES [1996]. The object is to 
internalize the costs of damages byshifting the liability burden to vicarious or 
creditworthy third parties. Furthermore, operators have to choose an adequate 
level of preventive measures. This means the necessity of finding a trade-off 
between the amount dedicated to the repairs and the level of safety effort 
(BOYER AND LAFFONT [1997]). Under complete information this goal is 
reached, however, under asymmetric information, only the second best level of 
prevention can be achieved
7
.  
                                                 
7
 HIRIART AND MARTIMORT [2006a] consider the optimal regulation of a risky 
project under a moral hazard assumption. By fines and rewards, the authors derive 
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In a first section, the basic features of the model are given. The first rank 
level of safety effort under symmetric information for standard strict liability 
regime is defined. A second section shows that information asymmetry breaks this 
scheme because efficient agents are deterred to exert the risky activity. In a third 
section, capped liability is introduced and, there,is studied howthe most efficient 
agent is led to supply the first rank level of effort. A fourth section concludes. 
2. Economic environment: technology, preferences, information 
This paper applies the methodology of asymmetric information theory, 
but, basically, it rests on the foundations of liability theory developed by 
SHAVELL [1986] because determiningthe optimal level of care is central. The 
principal corresponds to a government that expects from agents (operators of risky 
facilities) the highest level of safety. In our representation, agent and principal 
focus on safety mainly. That means that reference to the supplied quantity is only 
implicit. Indeed, the agents differ by the marginal costs of their safety 
effort.Regarding quantities, the principal considers that the marginal production 
costs of gross production are almost identical. The competitive difference is made 
by the level of safety brought by the operators. Putting it otherwise, if basic 
production technologies are roughly similar, they differ mainly by the levelof 
safety that the agent embeds in it. 
The range of application and relationship is wide. This may concern as 
well the relationships between government and utilities that supply environmental 
services as water, waste treatment, etc, but also the regulation of electro-nuclear 
plants, or energetic facilities. The transfers remunerate the supplementary efforts 
that improve safety beyond what is expected which is reflected in differentiated 
marginal costs
8
. This state of matter is a common feature considering most 
modern products and productions because knowledge about basic technology is 
available everywhere. Consequently, supplying a basic service as, for instance, 
fresh water, sewage, power, etc, can be achieved by any firm. However, efficiency 
in safety differs from an agent to another one. For instance electro-nuclear power 
may be supplied by highly secure plants or by less efficient ones as the 
Tchernobyl catastrophe in 1986 revealed it. Nowadays, for most products and 
production, competition bears more on quality or safety (here safety) than on 
quantity. 
Consequently, in order to assess a relevant level of transfers to pay for 
safety (as an embedded part of the total price) the principal has to induce the 
                                                                                                                                     
conditions under which extending liability to the principal improves social welfare. If the 
principal has all the bargaining power, then extended liability favors the internalization of 
environmental damage and so improves welfare(BALKENBORG [2001]). 
 
8
 Brands differ in their specific embedded equipment about safety or quality (see for 
instance, (GABSZEWICZ AND THISSE [1979], (TIROLE [1988, chap.7], (TAY 
[2003]), (TOSHIMITSU AND JINJI [2007]). 
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operators to supply the highest level of care. Let us explain the point. Most of 
risky activities are under the supervision of authorities or State Agencies. They 
give permits and administrative authorizations to operators that deal with 
dangerous activities (chemical plants, electro-nuclear production, waste treatment, 
etc.). This belongs to the set of ex ante regulation. That involves the regular 
checking up of the quality andthe safety of the products. For instance, steady 
inspections may verify the safety of facilities, the existence of installations etc. 
This may be assimilated to the checking of the level of the safety effort 𝑒. 
However, the Principalcannot appreciate the effective efficiency of the agent 
when managing this effort. For instance, the Deepwater Horizon rig explosion 
causing the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, had suffered a leak in the weeks leading up 
to the blast. This leak has been insufficiently appreciated by the BP’s 
management. PATZEK [2010]considers that the problem is deeper than a simple 
monitoring question and involves the necessary revision of the whole production 
structure. Difference in marginal costs in safety indicates the degree of skill of the 
agent and this is private information. This is the root of asymmetric information in 
our model. Hence, if the principal can accede to the level of agents’ safety effort, 
he cannot appreciate their effective skill. The more efficient an agent is, the 
lowest his safety marginal costs.  
2.1 General feature of the model 
A government through a regulatory agency (noted RA) wants to induce the 
operators of risky facilities to accompany the provision of their production or 
services with the highest level of safety. Compared to models that deals with 
liability and competition, as (PITCHFORD[1995]), (BOYER 
ANDLAFFONT[1997]), (BOYD AND INGBERMAN [1997]), (HIRIART AND 
MARTIMORT[2006b]), the level of safety effort is dissociated from the 
efficiency about the skill of the firm in its management of safety. This could 
correspond for instance to the relationships between a facility (energy as a nuclear 
plant), and the government. The government through a set of transfers 
corresponding either to subsidies allocated for R&D for safety for instance, or for 
other motives associated with a care effort or through credit policy, or other 
government intervention as fixation of tariffs  (KOPLOW[2004]) and (KOPLOW 
[2010 p.17]) will induce the operator to supply the highest safety effort. These 
transfers remunerate or pay the supplement of safety that is above the standard 
product.  
Rather, here, the tradition initiated by SHAVELL [1986] will be followed 
and the present analysis will focus on the care effort level 𝑒, (𝑒 ≥ 0). The 
Principal derives a benefit 𝑆 𝑒  from the acquisition of the good so long as it 
ensures an adequate level of safety𝑒.𝑆 𝑒 is defined on ℝ with 𝑆𝑒
′ > 0 and 𝑆𝑒𝑒
′′ <
0. Furthermore, this function satisfies the Inada condition: 𝑆 ′(0) → +∞and 
lim𝑒→0 𝑆
′(𝑒) 𝑒 = 0. 
Both regimes will be analyzedrespectively, i.e. the strict liability one and 
the capped one.This last regime puts ceilings of the level of repairs. Let 𝑦be the 
level of the agent’s wealth and,𝐷, the level of a majordamagewhich exceeds the 
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agent’s financial capacities (𝑦 < 𝐷). Under a standard liability regime, if a 
benevolent Court considers the agent liable, he will have to pay from his own 
assets. If these ones are insufficient, he becomes judgment proof (SUMMERS 
[1983]), (SHAVELL [1986]). Under a capped liability scheme, the amount of 
damage is fixed to 𝐶, where 𝐶 < 𝐷 and the liable agents can escape the judgment-
proof situation.The potential damage 𝐷 of the activity is common knowledge as 
the probability distribution of the environmental harm 𝑝(𝑒) where 𝑝𝑒
′ < 0and 
𝑝𝑒𝑒
′′ > 0. 
Informational asymmetries are twofold:i) the level of safety effort and ii) 
the agent’s wealth that cannot be considered as public information.This last 
assumption seems quite natural because the operator’s effective wealth is private 
information. 
2.2The utility functions  
When the regulatory agency acquires the public good, he requires also a 
given level of safety and the RA’s utility function is: 
(1)     𝑉 = 𝑆 𝑒 − 𝑡, 
where, 𝑡 is the payment made to the agentby the RA,𝑡 has to behigh 
enough to cover the costs induced by the production activity and the safety effort. 
If 𝑈 is the profit function of the agent: 
(2)     𝑈 = 𝑡 − 𝐶 𝑒, 𝐾 .  
This writing means that the agent assesses both cost of safety and he has to 
internalize the possible damage to the environment 𝐾𝑝(𝑒) where𝐾 = {𝐶, 𝑦}is the 
amount of the redress under a capped strict liability regime for a fixed amount 
𝐶and a 𝑦(the amount of his wealth) for a “standard” strict liability. The value 𝜃 
stands for themarginal cost ofsafety efforts made by the agent where  𝜃 ∈
 𝜃, 𝜃 with𝜃 (respectively𝜃) the marginal safety effort cost of the efficient (resp. 
inefficient) agent). Asagent’s efficiency is private information, the regulatory 
agency assesses the following probability distribution on the distribution between 
efficient agent(ϑ) and inefficient ones(1 − ϑ), ( 1 ≥ ϑ ≥ 0). 
Then, is defined the firm’scost function considering the possibility of the 
occurrence of a severe accident (probability 𝑝(𝑒)). The expected cost of safety 
writes now: 
(3)     𝐶 𝜃, 𝑒, 𝐾 = 𝜃𝑒 1 − 𝑝 𝑒  +  𝜃𝑒 + 𝐾 𝑝 𝑒  
or, after developing: 
(4)     𝐶 𝜃, 𝑒, 𝐾 = 𝜃𝑒 + 𝐾𝑝 𝑒 , 
for𝜃 ∈  𝜃, 𝜃  and 𝐾 = {𝐶, 𝑦}. 
Then, the profit function becomes: 
(5)     𝑈 = 𝑡 − 𝐶 𝜃, 𝑒, 𝐾 = 𝑡 − 𝜃𝑒 − 𝐾𝑝(𝑒). 
Then, the society’s welfare function is deduced (see section A.1 in the 
Appendix): 
(6)   𝑊 = U + V = 𝑆 𝑒 −  𝜃𝑒 − 𝑝 𝑒 𝐷for 𝜃 ∈  𝜃, 𝜃 . 
This function is such that𝑊 ′ 𝑒 > 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑊"(𝑒) > 0, because𝑆′ 𝑒 >
0, 𝐷 > 0 and𝑝′ 𝑒 > 0.As for standard asymmetric information theory, the 
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contracting outcomecan be defined. Here, the relevant variables are the level of 
effort 𝑒which is necessary to achieve an acceptable level of safety and the transfer 
𝑡 received by the agent. Let Ξbe the set of feasible allocations: 
𝛯 =   𝑒, 𝑡 : 𝑒 ∈ ℝ +,𝑡 ∈ ℝ ,  
These variables are both observable and verifiable by a third party such as 
a benevolent court of law.Hence, the effectiveinformational asymmetries are the 
agent’s level of wealth and his efficiency level of safety. Thisextendsthe models 
of SHAVELL [1984], [1986], and [1987]or LANDES AND POSNER[1989] 
toinformational asymmetries. 
2.3The Complete Information Optimal Contract 
2.3.1The first-best safety level  
Let us assume first that there is no informationasymmetry between the 
principal and the agent(either in efficiency or in wealth). Then, the government 
can perform an appropriate transfer.The efficient care levels are obtained by 
equating the principal’s marginal value and the agent’s marginal cost and are 
deduced the following first-order conditions from (6): 
(7)     𝑆′ 𝑒∗ =  𝜃 + 𝑝′ 𝑒∗ 𝐷 
and, 
(8)     𝑆′ 𝑒
∗
 = 𝜃 + 𝑝′ 𝑒
∗
 𝐷. 
The complete information efficient safety level 𝑒∗ and 𝑒
∗
 should be carried 
out if their social values, respectively 𝑊∗ = 𝑆 𝑒∗ − 𝜃𝑒∗ − 𝑝 𝑒∗ 𝐷 and 𝑊
∗
=
𝑆 𝑒
∗
 − 𝜃𝑒
∗
− 𝑝 𝑒
∗
 𝐷 are non-negative. Then, proposition 1 can be settled (its 
proof is brought in Appendix A.2): 
PROPOSITION 1:If𝑊∗ = 𝑆 𝑒∗ −  𝜃𝑒∗ − 𝑝 𝑒∗ 𝐷 and 𝑊
∗
= 𝑆 𝑒
∗
 −  𝜃𝑒
∗
−
𝑝 𝑒
∗
 𝐷 are non-negative,then: 
(9) 𝑆 𝑒∗ −  𝜃𝑒∗ − 𝑝 𝑒∗ 𝐷 ≥ 𝑆 𝑒
∗
 −  𝜃𝑒
∗
− 𝑝 𝑒
∗
 𝐷 ≥ 𝑆 𝑒
∗
 −  𝜃𝑒
∗
− 𝑝 𝑒
∗
 𝐷. 
This relationship involves that the social value of the protectionlevel is 
higher when the agent is efficient than when it is not.  
2.3.2Implementing the first-best 
For a successful delegation of the task, the principal has to offer the agent 
a utility level that is at least as high as the level the agent obtains outside the 
relationship. These arethe agent’s participation constraints. Then, the quo-utility 
level or participation constraintswrite as: 
(10)    𝑡 −  𝜃𝑒 − 𝑝 𝑒 𝑦 ≥ 0  
(11)    𝑡 −  𝜃𝑒 − 𝑝 𝑒 𝑦 ≥ 0.  
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To implement the first-best production levels, the principal makesa 
contract of a take-it or leave-it type to the agent and supply a 𝑡∗, 𝑒∗ -contract for 
the efficient agent (𝜃) or a  𝑡
∗
, 𝑒
∗
 -contractfor the inefficient one(𝜃). Hence,under 
symmetric information assumption, the principal needs to know perfectly the 
agent’s wealth level to performan appropriate payment. Indeed, the transfer 
𝑡includes both the safety price and the risk cover.  
3. Asymmetric information and information rents: the case of 
standard strict liability 
Now, we analyze the situation characterized by information asymmetries 
(efficiency and wealth) between the RA and the agent in a standard strict liability 
framework. Hence,if the agent isliable for the harm, he will have to repair by 
engaging the whole of his assets. 
3.1 The agent’s program under standard strict liability 
The agent knows privately how efficienthe is and his wealth level.These 
values are ignored by the principal who has to design an incentive mechanism that 
will reveal this double information. Conform to standard asymmetric information 
theory (LAFFONT AND MARTIMORT[2002, chap.2]),a menu of contracts 
𝒞 =   𝑡, 𝑒 , (𝑡, 𝑒)   is incentive compatible when  𝑡, 𝑒  is weakly preferred to 
(𝑡, 𝑒) by the agent 𝜃 and (𝑡, 𝑒) is weakly preferred to  𝑡, 𝑒  by the agent 𝜃. This 
involves that the following constraints (incentive compatibility constraints) have 
to be respected: 
(12)    𝑡 − 𝑐(𝜃 , 𝑒, 𝑦) ≧  𝑡 − 𝑐(𝜃, 𝑒, 𝑦) 
(13)    𝑡 − 𝑐(𝜃, 𝑒, 𝑦) ≧ 𝑡 − 𝑐(𝜃, 𝑒, 𝑦). 
A supplementary condition is that participation constraints have to be 
respected too: 
(14)    𝑡 − 𝑐(𝜃 , 𝑒, 𝑦) ≧  0 
(15)    𝑡 − 𝑐(𝜃, 𝑒, 𝑦) ≧ 0. 
The menu of contracts is incentive feasible if the constraints (12)to (15)are 
satisfied. Contracts in 𝒞 are truthful, i.e. the firm is induced to report its true 
technological parameters. We define the information rents of the agent of each 
type as: 
(16)    𝑈 =  𝑡 − 𝑐(𝜃 , 𝑒, 𝑦) 
(17)    𝑈 =  𝑡 − 𝑐(𝜃, 𝑒, 𝑦). 
Then we can define the amount that an efficient agent can capture by 
mimicking an inefficient agent. However, the risk question makesthis point more 
delicate. Hence, if the efficient agent can mimic the 𝜃 agent by adapting its supply 
of security service, a priori, he cannot imitate the 𝜃agent’s level of wealth𝑦which 
is unknown to him... Furthermore, in the case of an accident, his effective wealth 
10 
 
 
 
will be engaged. Hence, the informational rent depends only on the level of 
supplied safety which expresses as: 
𝑈 =  𝑡 − 𝑐  𝜃 , 𝑒, 𝑦 ≧ 𝑡 − 𝑐  𝜃 , 𝑒, 𝑦  
or, still: 
𝑈 =  𝑡 − 𝑐(𝜃, 𝑒, 𝑦) −  𝑐 𝜃, 𝑒 + 𝑐(𝜃, 𝑒, 𝑦)
=  𝑈 −   𝜃𝑒 + 𝑦𝑝 𝑒  +  𝜃𝑒 − 𝑦𝑝 𝑒   
(18)   𝑈 =  𝑡 − 𝑐 𝜃 , 𝑒 ≧  𝑈 +  ∆𝜃𝑒 −  ∆𝑦𝑝(𝑒) 
(Where∆𝜃 = 𝜃 − 𝜃 > 0and ∆𝑦 = 𝑦 − 𝑦). 
Knowinga prioriwhether the wealth difference∆𝑦 is positive or negative is 
impossible. Indeed, we cannot postulate that the efficient agent has to be richer 
than the inefficient one or the reverse. The consequences of bothdesigns have to 
be discussed. 
3.2 The program of the principal under standard strict liability 
To overcome the uncertainty induced by informational asymmetries, the 
principal offers a menu of contracts. Before defining his complete program, we 
have to define the regulator’sexpected gainwhich expresses as: 
 𝑆 𝑒 − 𝑡  1 − 𝑝 𝑒  +   𝑆 𝑒 − 𝑡 −  𝐷 − 𝑦  𝑝 𝑒 = 𝑆 𝑒 −  𝐷 − 𝑦 𝑝 𝑒 −  𝑡. 
Then, taking into account the nature of the agent,the principal’s program 
writes as: 
(19) 𝑀𝑎𝑥  𝑡 ,𝑒 ,(𝑡 ,𝑒)  𝜗  𝑆 𝑒 −  𝐷 − 𝑦 𝑝 𝑒 −  𝑡 + (1 − 𝜗)(𝑆 𝑒 −
 𝐷 − 𝑦 𝑝 𝑒 − 𝑡 ),subject to the constraints(12) to (15). 
Considering the information rents 𝑈 =  𝑡 − 𝑐(𝜃 , 𝑒, 𝑦)and 𝑈 =  𝑡 −
𝑐(𝜃, 𝑒, 𝑦), we can replace the value of the transfers by the information rents, 
and,then,the program becomes: 
(20) 𝑀𝑎𝑥  𝑈,𝑒 , 𝑈,𝑒  𝜗  𝑆 𝑒 −  𝜃𝑒 − 𝐷𝑝 𝑒  + 
(1 − 𝜗)(𝑆 𝑒 −  𝜃𝑒 − 𝐷𝑝 𝑒 )– (𝜗𝑈 + (1 − 𝜗)𝑈), 
subject to the incentive constraints: 
(12a)    𝑈 ≧  𝑈 +  ∆𝜃𝑒  −  ∆𝑦𝑝(𝑒) 
(13a)    𝑈 ≧ 𝑈 −  ∆𝜃𝑒 + ∆𝑦𝑝(𝑒) 
and the participation constraints: 
(14a)    𝑈 ≧ 0 
(15a)    𝑈 ≧ 0 
The principal aims, first, atmaximizing the net safety surplus and, second, 
minimizing the information rents. In general, following standard presentation 
(LAFFONT AND MARTIMORT [2002]), finding solution to this program 
involves choosingthe relevant constraints, i.e. the binding ones at the 
optimum.Hence, the relevant constraints are reduced from four to two: the 
incentive constraint of the efficient agent and the participation constraint of the 𝜃 
agent. Now, taking into account the severe accident occurrence, this simplification 
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has to be made cautiously because the agent’s wealth is privately known and this 
adds a supplementary uncertainty.  
PROPOSITION 2:Considering standard strict liability regime, when the 
probability of severe accident with social impact (health or environment) is 
introduced, the revelation mechanism depends on the wealth of each category’s of 
agent.Considering the program (20) to(15’), the necessary condition for solving it 
is that𝑦 > 𝑦. 
PROOF: In appendix A3. 
This proposition means that when the inefficient agent is richer than the 
efficient one, the usual mechanism that involves that efficient agent will supply 
the first best level of effortdoes not workanymore. Indeed,(15a) (𝑈 ≧ 0) cannot be 
respected(this value can be negative).The efficient agent ignores if his assets are 
higher than the ones of the inefficient agentand, logically, he is deterred to 
participate.  
If 𝑦 > 𝑦, (proposition 2 fulfilled), the remaining relevant constraints are 
(12a),and (15a),and both of them have to be binding. Consequently:  
(12b)    𝑈 =  ∆𝜃𝑒 −  ∆𝑦𝑝(𝑒)   
and, 
(13b)     𝑈 = 0. 
Implementing them into the principal’s program, we get: 
(20a) 𝑀𝑎𝑥 (𝑒  ,𝑒 𝜗  𝑆 𝑒 − 𝜃𝑒 − 𝐷𝑝 𝑒  + (1 − 𝜗)(𝑆 𝑒 − 𝜃𝑒 − 𝐷𝑝 𝑒 )–
𝜗 ∆𝜃𝑒 − ∆𝑦𝑝 𝑒  . 
From the analysis of the first order conditions,are deduced the 
informational rents that the efficient agent can capture. Indeed, if the inefficient 
agent gets no rent by mimicking the 𝜃 agent,the efficient agentmay acquire 
information rent. We note by “SB” the second best optimal values. The first order 
conditions are given by: 
(21)    𝑆′ 𝑒𝑆𝐵 =  𝜃 + 𝐷𝑝′ 𝑒𝑆𝐵 . 
This corresponds to the first best value of 𝑒 and 𝑒𝑆𝐵=𝑒∗. The informational 
rent of the principal is then equal to 𝑈 =  ∆𝜃𝑒
𝑆𝐵
− ∆𝑦𝑝(𝑒
𝑆𝐵
). Concerning the 
inefficient agent:  
(22)   1 − 𝜗 (𝑆′ 𝑒
𝑆𝐵
 −  𝜃 −  𝐷𝑝′ 𝑒
𝑆𝐵
 )  =  𝜗(∆𝜃 − ∆𝑦𝑝′ 𝑒
𝑆𝐵
 ) 
 (22)expresses the tradeoff between efficiency and rent extraction. 
Here 𝜗  ∆𝜃 − ∆𝑦𝑝′ 𝑒
𝑆𝐵
  > 0because 𝑝′ 𝑒
𝑆𝐵
 < 0, ∆𝑦 > 0 and ∆𝜃>0. The 
question is to know if this condition is compatible with the monotony condition 
that can be deduced from [12’] and [13’]. It appears from them that: 
0 ≧  ∆𝜃 𝑒
𝑆𝐵
−  𝑒𝑆𝐵 −  ∆𝑦  𝑝 𝑒
𝑆𝐵
 − 𝑝 𝑒𝑆𝐵  . 
By assumption ∆𝑦 > 0, 𝑝 𝑒
𝑆𝐵
 − 𝑝 𝑒𝑆𝐵 >0 because 𝑒𝑆𝐵=𝑒∗ hence 
∆𝑦  𝑝 𝑒
𝑆𝐵
 − 𝑝 𝑒𝑆𝐵  > 0 and −(∆𝑦  𝑝 𝑒
𝑆𝐵
 − 𝑝 𝑒𝑆𝐵  < 0). Furthermore, 
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∆𝜃 > 0and 𝑒
𝑆𝐵
−  𝑒𝑆𝐵 < 0, then the proposition is verified and we getthe 
following relationship: 
(23)    𝑒∗ = 𝑒𝑆𝐵 > 𝑒
∗
> 𝑒
𝑆𝐵
. 
Now we can determine the level of the second best transfers taking into 
account the information rent. For that, we recall that from its definition: 
𝑈𝑆𝐵 =  𝑡𝑆𝐵 − 𝑐 𝜃 , 𝑒𝑆𝐵 =∆𝜃𝑒
𝑆𝐵
−  ∆𝑦𝑝(𝑒
𝑆𝐵
), 
then, 
(24)   𝑡𝑆𝐵 −  𝜃𝑒 − 𝑦𝑝 𝑒 = ∆𝜃𝑒
𝑆𝐵
−  ∆𝑦𝑝 𝑒
𝑆𝐵
 . 
As a consequence: 
(25)   𝑡𝑆𝐵 =  𝜃𝑒∗ + 𝑦𝑝 𝑒∗ + ∆𝜃𝑒
𝑆𝐵
−  ∆𝑦𝑝(𝑒
𝑆𝐵
) 
and, 
(26)   𝑡
𝑆𝐵
= 𝜃𝑒
𝑆𝐵
+  𝑦𝑝 𝑒
𝑆𝐵
 . 
These results differ slightlyfrom standard asymmetric information theory. 
They call for some remarks. 
REMARK 1:It is legitimate to consider that ∆𝜃 = 𝜃 − 𝜃 > 0, that expresses the 
difference in efficiency of agent 𝜃 compared to agent 𝜃 considering marginal 
costs. However,there is no economic legitimacy putting ∆𝑦 = 𝑦 − 𝑦 > 0 (or the 
reverse) as an assumption. Proposition 2 results from a strong assumption. 
However, in general,there is no economic reason to consider that the efficient 
agent should be richer than the inefficient one or the reverse.  
REMARK 2: We can check that the informational rent of the efficient agent is 
positive only if: 𝑝 𝑒∗ >  1 −
𝑦
𝑦
 𝑝 𝑒
𝑆𝐵
 , with1 >
𝑦
𝑦
> 0(proof in appendix). 
If this condition is not met, then the value of the informational rent can be 
weak. Concretely, this condition means that the difference between the efforts 
brought by the efficient agent compared to the inefficient one, has to be higher 
than 
𝑦
𝑦
𝑝 𝑒
𝑆𝐵
 . The demonstration of this remark is made in Appendix A4. 
REMARK 3: Under a standard strict liability regimeand asymmetric information, 
the efficient agents may be deterred to enter in the game. Indeed, two conditions 
have to be met to induce him to compete. The first one is necessary but 
insufficient (proposition 1) i.e. his level of wealth has to be higher than the one of 
the inefficient agent. The other condition, (sufficient) is that the level of safety 
effort has to be high enough such that the difference in the probability of accident 
will exceed
𝑦
𝑦
𝑝 𝑒
𝑆𝐵
 .  
This condition is particularly stringent because the efficient agent must 
know too much information before accepting the contract. Indeed, the efficient 
agent cannot know the nature of his opponent’s wealth.   
REMARK 4: The constraint [13a] (𝑈 ≧ 𝑈 − ∆𝜃𝑒 + ∆𝑦𝑝(𝑒))means that the 
inefficient agent claims that he is efficient but he will fail to supply the promised 
level of safety. This is typically an adverse selection problem. However, it cannot 
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be solved here because instruments that could induce the efficient agent to 
overcome his reluctance to produce when conditions are not favorable are lacking. 
As a conclusion, standard strict liability is not a powerful instrument to 
protect public health and the environment. This result has long been known 
(SHAVELL [1986]) and asymmetric information reinforces the point. We show 
furthermore that uncertainty about wealth level under this regime tends to favor 
the adverse selection effect. This state of matter introduces biases in the calculus 
of the efficient agent.  
4. The Capped strict liability scheme and asymmetric information 
In this section two points will be discussed: first, the way to get an 
acceptable solution for the strict liability scheme and second, the consequences for 
a better involvement of associated financing institution. Hence capped liability 
allow to secure investment and makes easier insuring investment.  
4.1 A solution for the ceiling of liability 
Now we make the assumption that Law limits the amount of repairs. The 
ceiling of damages should preserve the wealth of the agent:𝐶 < 𝑦 < 𝐷,𝐶 > 0. 
This induces to modify generically the cost function as: 
(27)   𝐶 𝑒, 𝜃, 𝑦 = 𝜃𝑒 + 𝐶𝑝 𝑒 . 
As previously, the informational rent expresses as: 
(28)   𝑈𝐶 =  𝑡 − 𝑐(𝜃 , 𝑒, 𝑦) ≧ 𝑡 −  𝑐(𝜃 , 𝑒, 𝑦) 
and,processing as before when we got equation (18): 
(29)   𝑈𝐶 ≧ 𝑈
𝐶
+  ∆𝜃𝑒 
(Where the index 𝐶to 𝑈𝐶  and 𝑈
𝐶
indicates that the new liability regime is 
capped strict liabilityand where ∆𝜃 = 𝜃 − 𝜃 > 0).Using the same argumentfor 
𝑈
𝐶
: 
(30)   𝑈
𝐶
=  𝑡 − 𝑐 𝜃, 𝑒, 𝑦 ≧  𝑈𝐶 −  ∆𝜃𝑒.  
The principal’s program becomes now (simplification in the appendix) 
(Program PC): 
(31) 𝑀𝑎𝑥
  𝑈𝐶 ,𝑒 , 𝑈
𝐶
,𝑒  
𝜗  𝑆 𝑒 − 𝜃𝑒 − 𝐷𝑝 𝑒  +  1 − 𝜗  𝑆 𝑒 − 𝜃𝑒 −
 𝐷𝑝𝑒−𝜗𝑈𝐶+1−𝜗𝑈𝐶, 
subjectto the constraints: 
(32)    𝑈𝐶 ≧  𝑈
𝐶
+  ∆𝜃𝑒 
(33)    𝑈
𝐶
≧  𝑈𝐶 −  ∆𝜃𝑒 
(34)    𝑈𝐶 ≧ 0 
(35)    𝑈
𝐶
≧ 0. 
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As previously, we have to definewhich are the relevant constraints among 
the incentive compatibility and participation constraints. Relevancy means the 
binding ones at the optimum level. We consider contracts without collapse, i.e. 
𝑒 > 0. This is verified when the Inada condition 𝑆 ′(0) → +∞is satisfied 
andlim𝑒→0 𝑆
′(𝑒) 𝑒 = 0. The participation constraint of the efficient agent in [34] 
is always satisfied because [32] and [35] involves [34]. In this context, the 
inefficient agent has no interest to mimic efficiency, then [33] is irrelevant. After 
this simplification, two constraints are remaining the 𝜃-agent’s incentive 
compatible constraint [32] and the participation constraint of the 𝜃-agent [35]. 
Getting the optimum of the PC program involves that both constraint must be 
binding: 
(36)     𝑈𝐶 ≧  ∆𝜃𝑒  
and, 
(37)     𝑈
𝐶
= 0.  
This reduces the objective function of the program (PC) becomes: 
(38) 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑒 ,𝑒 𝜗  𝑆 𝑒 −  𝜃𝑒 − 𝐷𝑝 𝑒  +  1 − 𝜗  𝑆 𝑒 −  𝜃𝑒 − 𝐷𝑝 𝑒  −
 𝜗∆𝜃𝑒.  
As in standard representations, asymmetric information modifies the 
principal’s optimization by the subtraction of the expected rent that has to be 
given up to the 𝜃 agent. This rent depends on the level of effort requested from the 
inefficient type. From the first order conditions is drawn the equilibrium values 
which are identical to the full information setting for the efficient agent. 
(39)   𝑆′ 𝑒𝑆𝐵 =  𝜃 + 𝐷𝑝′ 𝑒𝑆𝐵 ,   
and for the inefficient one: 
(40)   𝑆′ 𝑒
𝑆𝐵
 −  𝜃   =  
𝜗
 1−𝜗 
∆𝜃.   
It can be verified that with a similar argument made for the standard 
liability schemecan be defined the following relationship that follows from the 
monotony of the second-best schedule of safety level: 
(41)   𝑒∗ = 𝑒𝑆𝐵 > 𝑒
∗
> 𝑒
𝑆𝐵′
 
(Where (". "𝑆𝐵′) stands for the second best under the capped regime).In 
summary, the following propositioncan deduced: 
PROPOSITION 3:Under asymmetric information, under a cap strict liability 
regime, the optimal contracts entail: 
- No safety effort distortion for the 𝜃 agent in respect to the first 
best 𝑒∗ = 𝑒𝑆𝐵  and a downward distortion for the 𝜃 type, gives: 
  𝑆′ 𝑒
𝑆𝐵
 −  𝜃   =  
𝜗
 1−𝜗 
∆𝜃, with 𝑒
∗
> 𝑒
𝑆𝐵′
. 
- Only the efficient  type gets a positive information rent given 
by: 
(42)   𝑈𝐶 =  ∆𝜃𝑒  
- The second best transfers are respectively: 
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(43)   𝑡𝑆𝐵 =  𝜃𝑒∗ + 𝐶𝑝 𝑒∗ + ∆𝜃𝑒
𝑆𝐵′
 
And 
(44)   𝑡
𝑆𝐵
= 𝜃𝑒 + 𝐶 𝑝 𝑒
𝑆𝐵
 . 
The proof is deduced from the previous argument.  
The ceiling of liability allowsdroppingthe unknown level of wealth. 
Indeed, by [29] and [30] the value of the ceiling replaces the agent’s wealth. 
Hence, the problem reduces to only one private information variable: the safety 
effortefficiency. The result that follows isquite standard. Under the ceiling of 
redress, the level of precautionary effort of the most efficient agent corresponds to 
the first rank of the symmetric information scheme. The counterpart is that this 
agent benefits of an informational rent that, however, is minimized by the optimal 
contract between the RA and the efficient agent. 
4.2 Capped liability and insurance: an introduction 
Conversely to a well shared opinion, the above results show that under 
asymmetric information, putting caps on redress issues on the same level of effort 
than the standard strict liability regime under symmetric information. After this 
initial result, many avenues must be explored. For instance, the issue of insurance 
has not beenaddressedalthough itis an important matterfor capped liability 
(SHAVELL [2005], (BOYD AND INGBERMAN [1997]). Subscribing policy 
insurance is compulsory for oil operators in the maritime sector and the nuclear 
industry. In this paper, the concern has been limited tothe scope and power of an 
ex post regulatory control based on the ceiling of redress under informational 
asymmetries. 
By ceiling the redress, the principal reduces the uncertainty involved by 
the unknown polluters’ wealth.Furthermore, itcan control the agents’ activity by 
requiring that theyhave to own at least the amount of the cap as financial 
guarantee. This inducesthe withdrawal of the insufficient endowed agents. This 
can be achieved by resorting to insurance. For instance, if Q is that share which is 
insured, where: 
𝐶 − 𝑄 = 𝑤(𝑤theshare of the agent’s wealth used as commitment). As a 
consequence, the agent has to cope with two principals: the RA and the insurance 
company. Indeed, the insurance premium is equivalent to 𝑄𝑝(𝑒) = 𝑚, that is to 
say the probability of an accident by the claim of the company. As a result, to 
reduce his premium the agent has to increase his level of effort. Indeed, the 
insurance company has to check that the level of safety corresponds to the level of 
the insurance premium. A further research will have to develop these 
relationships. 
5. Conclusion 
Under asymmetric information, standard strict liability rules fail to provide 
the first best level of effortin safety. Thisfavors adverse selection emergenceand 
16 
 
 
 
can induce inefficient operatorsto undertake risky activitiesbydeterring the 
efficient ones. Then, capping the level of redress can be an alternative to a 
standard strict liability regime. However, this switching does not guarantee 
automatically restoring efficiency. Indeed, some necessary conditions have to be 
fulfilled.  
In real life, bounding the level of repairs raises strong oppositionwhen 
people consider that the level of ceiling is too low. Consequently, under 
asymmetric information, the Principal has to formulate relevant contracts that 
make a tradeoff between the level of repairs and the level of safety effort. These 
contracts are second bestcontracts compared to the certain case under strict 
liability, but they adjust the level of safety to the level of the cap. At equilibrium, 
the level of care has to be chosen such that the marginalcosts of care are offset by 
marginal reductions in expected damages.To be fully efficient, a capped strict 
liability scheme needs to associate the utility level of the principal to a relevant 
level of security. This involves establishing a tradeoff between a relevant safety 
effort and its associated costs and the level of redress designed by the level of the 
cap. Indeed, this tradeoff balances the risk level that the principal can accept and 
the amount of the fund dedicated to repairs. 
Capping the repairs level does not mitigate the sharpness of the judgment-
proof question even if an efficient contract is formulated. However, it locks up the 
debate by explicitly involving all the parties. Hence, at the equilibrium,implicitly, 
the principal accepts incomplete repairs but the potential loss is balanced by 
anincrease in safety. These one consists in two points. First, the equilibrium level 
of effort is calculated on the whole cost of damage that the society can endure. 
The effort level is identical to the one of the certainty case reached under strict 
liability. Second, the contract attracts theefficient agent in safety and avoids the 
adverse selection effect. This eviction effect of inefficient agent can be reinforced 
by the requirement of insurance policy that introduces a new principal in the 
scheme.   
This paper brings a contribution to the debate about the reciprocal 
efficiency of capped or standard strict liability. It shows notably that under 
asymmetric information and a strict liability regime all opportunistic behavior can 
be adopted by inefficient operators and this leads to an inappropriate level of 
safety. Capping the level of redress induces to find again the care level of the 
symmetric information case under strict liability regime. The price to pay by the 
government is an information rent that can be minimized with an adequate level 
of transfer.This advocates for a generalization of strict liability with the capping 
of redresses as environmental policy. In the public’s opinion, this choice could 
appear as counterintuitive because the level of redress is less than the damage 
involved by the harm. However, this solution means that the principal balances 
between the costs of improvement in safety and the costs of repairs and 
compensation. Furthermore, as in the nuclear industry, the level of the cap can be 
progressively raised. This involves to pool insurance companies and the deep-
pocket lenders. This opens the debate on the other stream of the literature 
dedicated to the understanding of the judgment-proof question. This will 
constitute a further step in this research program. 
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Appendix 
A.1 The welfare function of society:  
 
𝑊 = 𝑆 𝑒  1 − 𝑝 𝑒  +   𝑆 𝑒 −  𝐷 − 𝐾  𝑝 𝑒 −  𝐶 𝑒 ⟹ 
𝑊 = 𝑆 𝑒  1 − 𝑝 𝑒  +   𝑆 𝑒 −  𝐷 − 𝐾  𝑝 𝑒 −  𝜃𝑒 − 𝑝 𝑒 𝐾 =  
𝑊 = 𝑆 𝑒 −  𝜃𝑒 − 𝑝 𝑒 𝐷for𝜃 ∈  𝜃, 𝜃  and 𝐾 = {𝐶, 𝑦}. 
Q.E.D. 
A.2.Proof of proposition 1 
To see this point we note that because, 𝑝 𝑒 < 𝑝 𝑒 , then 
𝑝 𝑒∗ 𝐷 − 𝑝 𝑒
∗
 𝐷 < 0, and 𝑆 𝑒∗ −  𝜃𝑒∗ > 0, 𝑆 𝑒
∗
 −  𝜃𝑒
∗
> 0 and  
𝑆 𝑒∗ −  𝜃𝑒∗ ≥ 𝑆 𝑒
∗
 −  𝜃𝑒
∗
≥ 𝑆 𝑒
∗
 −  𝜃𝑒
∗
, is verified then,  
𝑆 𝑒∗ −  𝜃𝑒∗ − 𝑝 𝑒∗ 𝐷 ≥ 𝑆 𝑒
∗
 −  𝜃𝑒
∗
− 𝑝 𝑒
∗
 𝐷 ≥ 𝑆 𝑒
∗
 −  𝜃𝑒
∗
−
𝑝 𝑒
∗
 𝐷is verified too.  
Q.E.D. 
A.3. Proof of proposition 2 
Hence, having 𝑈 ≧ 0[14’] cannot be considered as granted. Preliminary 
conditions have to be formulated. 𝑈 ≧ 0means that if 𝑈 ≧ 0 is binding ( 𝑈 = 0) 
then this involves that: 
𝑈 = ∆𝜃𝑒 − ∆𝑦𝑝(𝑒) ≧ 0 or, still,∆𝜃 ∆𝑦 ≧ 𝑝(𝑒) 𝑒 , by definition 
𝑝(𝑒) 𝑒 > 0(with 𝑝(𝑒) 𝑒 → 0 ), furthermore, by definition, ∆𝜃 > 0 then, the 
condition for having ∆𝜃 ∆𝑦 > 0 is that ∆𝑦 > 0 i.e. 𝑦 > 𝑦 because ∆𝜃 > 0. 
Hence, the condition for having 𝑈 ≧ 0 is that 𝑦 > 𝑦. That means that if the 
efficient agent is less rich than the inefficient one, then the participation constraint 
cannot be fulfilled. 
Q.E.D. 
A.4.Proof of remark 2 
Starting from  
𝑡𝑆𝐵 =  𝜃𝑒∗ + 𝑦𝑝 𝑒∗ + ∆𝜃𝑒
𝑆𝐵
−  ∆𝑦𝑝(𝑒
𝑆𝐵
) 
We study the conditions for which: 
𝑦𝑝 𝑒∗ −  ∆𝑦𝑝(𝑒
𝑆𝐵
) ≥ 0or still 𝑦𝑝 𝑒∗ −  (𝑦 − 𝑦)𝑝(𝑒
𝑆𝐵
) ≥ 0, under the 
respect of proposition 2, the results ensues: 
𝑝 𝑒∗ >  1 −
𝑦
𝑦
 𝑝 𝑒
𝑆𝐵
 . 
Getting the program  
𝑀𝑎𝑥  𝑡 ,𝑒 ,(𝑡 ,𝑒)  𝜗 𝑆 𝑒 −  𝐷 − 𝐶 𝑝 𝑒 −  𝑡 + (1 − 𝜗)(𝑆 𝑒 −  𝐷 − 𝐶 𝑝 𝑒 − 𝑡 ) 
subjectto the constraints of incentive compatibility: 
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𝑡 − 𝜃𝑒 − 𝐶𝑝 𝑒 ≧  𝑡 − 𝜃𝑒 − 𝐶𝑝 𝑒  
𝑡 − 𝑐(𝜃, 𝑒) ≧ 𝑡 − 𝑐(𝜃, 𝑒) 
and the supplementary condition of the participation constraints that have 
to be respected too: 
𝑡 − 𝜃𝑒 − 𝐶𝑝 𝑒 ≧  0 
𝑡 − 𝜃𝑒 − 𝐶𝑝 𝑒 ≧ 0. 
As previously, we can cancel the transfers 𝑡, 𝑡 and replacing them by the 
informational rents, we get the PC program.  
Q.E.D. 
20 
 
 
 
References 
 
ANDERSON, M.R. AND A. AHMED [1996], “Assessing Environmental 
Damage under Indian Law”, Review of European Community and 
International Environmental Law, Vol. 5, Issue 4, 335–341. 
BALKENBORG, D.[2001], “How Liable Should the Lender Be? The Case of 
judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risks: Comment”, American 
Economic Review, vol. 91(3), (June), 731–738. 
BARON, D.AND R. MYERSON [1982], “Regulating a Monopolist with 
Unknown Costs", Econometrica, 50, 911–930. 
BEARD, T. R. [1990], “Bankruptcy and Care Choice”, RAND Journal of 
Economics, 21-4, (Winter), 626–34. 
BOYD, J. [2001],“Financial Responsibility for Environmental Obligations: Are 
Bonding and Assurance Rules Fulfilling Their Promise?”Resources for the 
Future, Discussion Paper 01–42, http://www.rff.org. 
BOYD, J. AND D. INGBERMAN[1997],“The search for deep pockets: is 
“extended liability” expensive liability?”, Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organization, 13, n°1, (April), 233–258. 
BOYER, M. AND J-J. LAFFONT[1995],“Environmental Protection, Producer 
Insolvency and Lender Liability”,Cirano, working paper,Scientific Series, 
Montréal, n°95s-50, 32p.  
BOYER, M. AND J-J. LAFFONT[1997],“Environmental Risks and Bank 
Liability”, European Economic Review, 41, 8 (August), 1427–1459. 
BOYER, M., AND D. PORRINI  [2006], “Sharing Liability between Banks and 
Firms: The Case of Industrial Safety Risk”, Chap. 13 in M. Boyer, Y. Hiriart 
and D. Martimort (ed.), Frontiers in the Economics of Environmental 
Regulation and Liability, Ashgate Publishing, Hampshire. 
BOYER, M., AND D.PORRINI[2008], “The Efficient Liability Sharing Factor 
For Environmental Disasters: Lessons for Optimal Insurance Regulation,” 
Geneva Papers of Risk and Insurance: Issue and Practice, 33,337-362. 
DARI-MATTIACCI, G. [2006], “Limiting Limited Liability”, Economics 
Bulletin, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1–7. 
DARI-MATTIACCI, G. AND G. DE GEEST[2006],“When Will Judgment Proof 
Injurers Take Too Much Precaution?”International Review of Law and 
Economics, Volume 26, Issue 3, (September), 336–354. 
GABSZEWICZ J.J. AND J-F. THISSE[1979],“Price Competition, Quality, and 
Income Disparities”,Journal of Economic Theory, 20,3, (June), 340–359. 
FAURE, M. AND J. HUeds.[2006] “Prevention And Compensation of Marine 
Pollution Damage: Recent Developments in Europe, China And the US”, 
Kluwer Law International, Alphen aanden Rijn. 
FAURE, M., AND H. WANG[2008], “Financial caps for oil pollution damage: a 
historical mistake?”,Marine Policy, 32(4), 592–606. 
HEYES, A.[1996], “Lender penalty for environmental damage and the 
equilibrium cost of capital”, Economica, 63- 311–323. 
HIRIART, Y. ANDD.MARTIMORT  [2006a], “Environmental Risk Regulation 
and Liability under Adverse selection and Moral Hazard”, Chapter 9 in M. 
21 
 
 
 
Boyer, Y. Hiriart and D. Martimort (ed.), Frontiers in the Economics of 
Environmental Regulation and Liability, Ashgate Pub, UK Chippenham, 
Witshire. 
HIRIART, Y. ANDD. MARTIMORT[2006b],"The Benefits of Extended 
Liability", Rand Journal of economics, Vol.37, N°3, (Autumn), 562–582. 
KOLSTAD, C.,T. UHLEN AND G.JOHNSON[1990], “Ex Post Liability for 
Harm versus Ex-Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?” 
American Economic Review, 80, 4 (September), 888–901.  
KOPLOW, D.[2004],“Subsidies to Energy Industries”, in Encyclopedia of 
Energy, (C.J. Cleveland Editor), Volume 5. Elsevier Inc., Amsterdam, 749–
764. 
KOPLOW, D.[2010], “EIA Energy Subsidy Estimates: A Review of Assumptions 
and Omissions”, Earth Track, Inc., Cambridge MA,61 p. 
http://www.earthtrack.net/files/uploaded_files/EIA%20subsidy%20review%20fin
al_17Mar10.pdf 
JOST, P.-J. [1996], “Limited Liability and the Requirement to Purchase 
Insurance” International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 16, 2 (June), 
259–276. 
LAFFONT, J-J., AND D.MARTIMORT[2002], “The Theory Of Incentives: The 
Principal-Agent Model”,Princeton University Press, Oxford, 421p. 
LANDES, W.M, AND R.POSNER [1989],“TheEconomic Structure of Tort Law” 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 329p. 
MASKIN, E. AND J.,RILEY[1984] “Monopoly with Incomplete Information", 
Rand Journalof Economics, 15, 2 (Summer), 171–196. 
MICELI, T. J. AND K. SEGERSON[2003], “A Note on Optimal Care by Wealth 
Constrained Injurers”, International Review of Law and Economics, 23, 
3,273–284. 
MUSSA M. AND S. ROSEN[1978], “Monopoly and Product Quality”, Journal of 
EconomicTheory, 18, 2 (August),301–317. 
MYERSON, R. [1981], “Optimal Auction Design”, Mathematics of Operations 
Research, 6,58–73. 
PATZEK, T.W. [2010], “Energy and Environment Subcommittee of the Energy 
and Commerce Committee 06/09/10 Briefing”, June 8, 2010. 
http://gaia.pge.utexas.edu/papers/PatzekBriefing06092010.pdf (My last 
access: February 27, 2012). 
PITCHFORD R.[1995], “How Liable Should the Lender be? The Case of 
Judgement-Proof Firms and Environmental Risks", American Economic 
Review, 85, 5 (December), 1171–1186. 
OECD[2009], “Environmental Liability for Damage To Natural Resources in 
OECD Countries: The Concept And Key Approaches” Discussion paper 10-
12, June, Chisinau, Moldova. 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/57/42751266.pdf.(My last access: February 27, 
2012). 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
OECD,Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)[1982], “Exposé des Motifs”, Revised text 
of the Exposé des Motifs of the Paris Convention, approved by the OECD 
Council on 16th November 1982. 
http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/nlparis_motif.html, (My last access: 
February 27, 2012). 
ROMAN, A. [2008], “Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (CERCLA), United States”, Feb. 6th,  
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Comprehensive_Environmental_Response,_Comp
ensation,_and_Liability_Act_(CERCLA),_United_States 
Updated: April 14, 2011, (My last access: February 27, 2012). 
SHAVELL, S. [1984], “A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety 
Regulation”,RAND Journal of Economics, 15, 2 (Summer), 271–80.  
SHAVELL, S. [1986], “The Judgment Proof Problem”,International Review of 
Law and Economics, 6, 1 (June), 45–58.  
SHAVELL,S. [1987],Economic Analysis of Accident Law, Harvard University 
Press,Cambridge.  
SHAVELL, S. [2005],“Minimum asset requirements and compulsory liability 
insurance as solution to the judgment-proof  problem”, RAND Journal of 
Economics, Vol.36, 1 (Spring), 63–77. 
SCHMITZ, P.W. [2000], “On the joint use of liability and safety regulation”, 
International Review of Law and Economics, 20, 3 (September), 371–382. 
SIOPCF (Secretariat of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds) 
[2009], “The International Regime For Compensation For Oil Pollution 
Damage”, Sept.  http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/genE.pdf 
Updated: February, 2012, (My last access: February 27, 2012). 
SUMMERS, J. [1983],“The Case of the Disappearing Defendant: An Economic 
Analysis”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 132, 145-85. 
SCHWARTZ, J. A. [2006], “International Nuclear Third Party Liability Law: The 
Response to Chernobyl”,  
http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/genE.pdf, (My last access: February 27, 
2012). 
TAYA.[2003], “Assessing competition in hospital care “markets: the importance 
of accounting for quality differentiation”, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 
34, 4(Winter),  786–814. 
TIROLE J.[1988],“The Theory of Industrial Organization”, MIT Press, 
Cambridge. 
TOSHIMITSU T. AND JINJIN. [2007], “Quality Differentiation, Welfare, and 
the Mode of Competition in a Vertically Differentiated Product Market: A 
Note”, JapaneseEconomic Review, Vol. 58, 3 (September), . 407-16. 
VAN’T VELD K., G. RAUSSER AND L. SIMON[1997],“The judgement proof 
opportunity”, FondazioneEni EnricoMattei, Working papers 83.97. 
VAN’T VELD K. [2006], “Hazardous-industry restructuring to avoid liability for 
accidents” International Review of Law and Economics, Volume 26, 
3(September),297–322. 
WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION [2009], “Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage”, August 2009.http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf67.html. 
23 
 
 
 
Updated: August, 2011, (My last access: February 27, 2012). 
 
24 
 
 
 
Gérard Mondello 
University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, 
Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG), UMR 7321 
Centre de recherche en droit économique (CREDECO),  
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS). 
250, rue Albert Einstein 
06560 Valbonne Sophia Antipolis- France. 
gerard.mondello@gredeg.cnrs.fr 
 
